Despite the great achievements of deep neural networks (DNNs), the vulnerability of state-of-the-art DNNs raises security concerns of DNNs in many application domains requiring high reliability. We propose the fault sneaking a ack on DNNs, where the adversary aims to misclassify certain input images into any target labels by modifying the DNN parameters. We apply ADMM (alternating direction method of multipliers) for solving the optimization problem of the fault sneaking a ack with two constraints: 1) the classi cation of the other images should be unchanged and 2) the parameter modi cations should be minimized. Speci cally, the rst constraint requires us not only to inject designated faults (misclassi cations), but also to hide the faults for stealthy or sneaking considerations by maintaining model accuracy. e second constraint requires us to minimize the parameter modi cations (using 0 norm to measure the number of modi cations and 2 norm to measure the magnitude of modi cations). Comprehensive experimental evaluation demonstrates that the proposed framework can inject multiple sneaking faults without losing the overall test accuracy performance.
INTRODUCTION
Modern technologies based on pa ern recognition, machine learning, and speci cally deep learning, have achieved signi cant breakthroughs [1] in a variety of application domains. Deep neural network (DNN) has become a fundamental element and a core enabler in the ubiquitous arti cial intelligence techniques. However, despite the impressive performance, many recent studies demonstrate Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. that state-of-the-art DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial a acks [2, 3] . is raises concerns of the DNN robustness in many applications with high reliability and dependability requirements such as face recognition, autonomous driving, and malware detection [4, 5] .
A er the exploration of adversarial a acks in image classication and objection detection from 2014, the vulnerability and robustness of DNNs have a racted ever-increasing a entions and e orts in the research eld known as adversarial machine learning. Since then, a large amount of e orts have been devoted to: 1) design of adversarial a acks against machine learning tasks [6] [7] [8] ; 2) security evaluation methodologies to systematically estimate the DNN robustness [9, 10] ; and 3) defense mechanisms under the a acks [11] [12] [13] . is paper falls into the rst category.
e adversarial a acks can be classi ed into: 1) evasion a acks [6] [7] [8] that perturb input images at test time to fool DNN classi cations; 2) poisoning a acks [14, 15] that manipulate training data sets to obtain illy-trained DNN models; and 3) fault injection a acks [16, 17] that change classi cations of certain input images to the target labels by modifying DNN parameters. e general purpose of an adversarial a ack no ma er its category is to have misclassications of certain images, while maintaining high model accuracy for the other images. is work proposes the fault sneaking a ack, a new method of the fault injection a ack.
Fault injection a ack perturbs the DNN parameter space. As DNNs are usually implemented and deployed on various hardware platforms including CPUs/GPUs and dedicated accelerators, it is possible to perturb the DNN parameters stored in memory enabled by the development of memory fault injection techniques such as laser beam [18] and row hammer [19] . To be practical, we propose the fault sneaking a ack to perturb the DNN parameters with considerations of a ack implementation in the hardware.
It is a more challenging task to perturb the parameters (as fault injection a ack) than to perturb the input images (as evasion attack) due to the following two reasons: 1) global e ect: perturbing one input would not in uence the classi cations of other unperturbed inputs while perturbing the parameters has a global e ect for all inputs; 2) numerous parameters: the DNNs usually have a much greater number of parameters than the pixel number of an input image. e fault injection a ack should be stealthy in that misclassi cations are only for certain images while maintaining high model accuracy for the other images, and therefore cannot be easily detected. And it should also be e cient in that the parameter modi cations should be as small as possible, and therefore can be implemented easily in the hardware. is work tackles these challenges by proposing the fault sneaking a ack based on ADMM (alternating direction method of multipliers).
e theoretical contributions of this work are: + Stealthy injection of multiple faults: e proposed fault sneaking a ack based on ADMM enables to achieve multiple designated faults (misclassi cations) with the exibility to specify any target labels and the stealthiness to hide the faults. e fault injection a ack [16] can only inject one fault.
+ A systematic application of ADMM with analytical solutions: Comparing with the heuristic [16] , the proposed fault sneaking a ack is an optimization based framework leveraging ADMM with analytical solutions. Comparing with evasion a acks [8, 20] , the proposed fault sneaking a ack deals with a more challenging problem with higher dimensionality, but surprisingly nds much less expensive analytical solutions.
+ A general ADMM framework for both 0 and 2 norm minimizations: e proposed ADMM based framework for solving the optimization problem of fault sneaking a ack can adopt both 0 norm (the number of parameter modi cations) and 2 norm (the magnitude of modi cations) to measure the di erence between original and modi ed DNN models with only minor changes. However, [16] cannot deal with the non-di erential 0 norm. e experimental contributions of this work are: + Less model accuracy loss: Under the same experimental settings and misclassi cation requirements, the proposed fault sneaking a ack degrades the DNN model accuracy by only 0.8 percent for MNIST and 1.0 percent for CIFAR, while [16] degrades the DNN model accuracy by 3.86 percent and 2.35 percent, respectively.
+ Comprehensive analysis of DNN fault tolerance: We extensively test the capability of DNNs on tolerance of fault injection a acks. We nd that there is an upper limit on the number S of images with successful misclassi cations depending on the DNN model itself. For the DNN models used in this work, the number S is around 10 demonstrating the tolerance for sneaking faults as 10.
RELATED WORK
e adversarial a acks are reviewed from the aspects of perturbing the inputs and perturbing the DNN parameters.
Perturbing the Input Space
Evasion a acks generate adversarial examples to fool DNNs by perturbing the legitimate inputs. Basically, an adversarial example is produced by adding human-imperceptible distortions onto a legitimate image, such that the adversarial example will be classi ed by the DNN as a target (wrong) label. e norm-ball constrained evasion a acks have been well studied, including the FGM [21] and IFGSM [22] a acks with ∞ norm restriction, the L-BFGS [3] and C&W [6] a acks minimizing the 2 distortion, and the JSMA [23] and ADMM [24] a acks trying to perturb the minimum number of pixels, namely, minimizing the 0 distortion.
Many defense works have been proposed, including defensive distillation [25] , defensive dropout [26, 27] , and robust adversarial training. [13] e robust adversarial training method ensures strong defense performance with high computation requirement.
Perturbing the Parameter Space
Poisoning a acks, which train DNNs by adding poisoned images into the training data sets, and fault injection a acks, which modify the DNN parameters directly, are a acks that perturb the DNN parameters. Poisoning a ack [14] is computation-intensive as it requires iterative retraining and is not the focus of our paper. Fault injection a ack [16] was rst proposed by Liu et al, which uses a heuristic approach to pro le the sink class for single bias a ack scheme, and compresses the modi cation by iteratively enforcing the smallest element as zero and feasibility check for gradient descent a ack scheme. Di erent from [16] , the fault sneaking a ack uses a systematic optimization-based approach, achieving exible designations of target labels and portion of DNN parameters to modify, and enabling both the 2 and 0 (non-di erential) norms in the objective function.
Practical Fault Injection Techniques
e common techniques ipping the logic values in memory include laser beam and row hammer. Laser beam [28] can precisely change any single bit in SRAM by carefully tuning the laser beam such as diameter and energy level [18] . Row hammer [19] can inject faults into DRAM by rapidly and repeatedly accessing a given physical memory location to ip corresponding bits [29] . Some works demonstrate the feasibility of using row hammer on mobile platforms [30] and launching the row hammer to trigger the processor lockdown [31] . However, ne-tuning the laser beam or locating the bits in memory can be time consuming [30] . erefore, it is essential to minimize the number of modi ed parameters by our fault sneaking a ack. Recently, [17] implements the DNN fault injection a ack [16] physically on embedded systems using laser beam. In particular, [17] injects faults into the widely used activation functions in DNNs and demonstrates the possibility to achieve misclassi cations by injecting faults into the DNN hidden layer.
PROBLEM FORMULATION reat Model:
We consider an adversary tampering with the DNN classi cation results of certain input images into designated target labels by modifying the DNN model parameters. In this paper, we assume white-box a ack, i.e., the adversary has the complete knowledge of the DNN model (including both structures and parameters) and low-level implementation details (how and where DNN parameters are located in the memory), as the highest and most stringent security standard to assess the robustness of DNN systems under fault sneaking a ack. Given existing fault injection techniques can precisely ip any bit of the data in memory, we assume the adversary can modify any parameter in DNN to any value that is in the valid range of the used arithmetic format. Note that, we do not assume the adversary knows the training and testing data sets, which are usually not available to the system users. e adversary has two constraints when launching the fault sneaking a ack: (i) Stealthy, in that the classi cation results of the other images should be kept as unchanged as possible; (ii) E cient, in that the modi cations of DNN parameters in terms of number of modi ed parameters or magnitude of parameter modi cations should be as small as possible.
e rst constraint is important because even if the a ack is speci ed for certain input images, it is highly possible to change the classi cation results of the other images when modifying the DNN parameters, thereby resulting in obviously low DNN model accuracy and easy detection of the a ack.
e second constraint minimizing the parameter modi cations can reduce the in uence and di culty of implementing the a ack.
Attack Model: Given R images X = {x i |i = 1, · · · , R} with their correct labels L = {l i |i = 1, · · · , R}, we would like to change the classi cation results of the rst S (S ≤ R) images to their target labels T = {t i |i = 1, · · · , S }, while the classi cations of the rest R − S images are unchanged, by modifying parameters in the DNN model. Note that the unchanged labels of the other R − S images are to make the a ack stealthy and hard to detect. e original DNN model parameters are denoted as θ , and δ represents the parameter modi cations. So the parameters a er the modi cation are θ + δ. Note that θ has the exibility of specifying either all the DNN parameters or only a portion of the parameters, e.g., weight parameters of the speci c layer(s). e fault sneaking a ack can be formulated as an optimization problem:
where D(δ) measures the DNN parameter modi cations; and G(θ + δ, X, T , L) represents the misclassi cation requirements, i.e., with the modi ed DNN model parameters θ + δ, the rst S images in set X will be classi ed as target labels T , while the classi cations of the rest R − S images are kept unchanged. e details of the D and G functions are to be explained in the following sections.
Measurements of Parameter Modi cations
D(δ) represents the measurement of the parameter modi cations, which should be minimized for the a ack implementation e ciency. In this paper, 0 and 2 norms are used as D(δ) as follows,
e 0 norm of δ measures the number of nonzero elements in δ and therefore measures the number of modi ed parameters by the a ack. Minimizing 0 norm can make it easier to implement the a ack in DNN systems, considering that the di culty of parameter modi cations in real systems relates to the number of modi ed parameters [19] . e 2 norm of δ denotes the standard Euclidean distance between the modi ed and original parameters, and therefore measures the magnitude of parameter modi cations. Minimizing 2 norm can lead to minimal in uence of the a ack.
Minimizing the 0 norm in the objective function is much harder than minimizing the 2 norm, because the 0 norm is non-di erential. In this paper, the proposed ADMM framework enables both 0 and 2 norms in the objective function with only minor di erences in the solution methods as speci ed in Sec. 4.
Misclassi cation Requirements
In (1), G(θ +δ, X, T , L) denotes the misclassi cation requirements: 1) the rst S images X 1 = {x i |i = 1, · · · , S } should be classi ed as the target labels T instead of their correct labels, and 2) the classi cations of the rest R − S images X 2 = {x i |i = S + 1, · · · , R} should remain unchanged as their correct labels. In the area of adversarial machine learning, the most e ective objective function to specify that an input x should be labeled as t is the following function [6] :
where Z (θ + δ, x) j denotes the j-th element of the logits, i.e., the input to the so max layer. e so max layer is the last layer in the DNN model, which takes logits as input and generates the nal probability distribution outputs. e nal outputs from the so max layer are not utilized in the above function, because the nal outputs are usually dominated by the most signi cant class in a well trained model and thus less e ective during computation.
e DNN chooses the label with the largest logit, that is, j * = arg max j Z (θ + δ, x) j . To enforce the input x is classi ed as label t, the logit of label t, Z (θ + δ, x) t , must be larger than all of the other logits, max j t (Z (θ + δ, x) j ). us, (θ + δ, t) will achieve its minimal value if x is classi ed as label t.
From the above analysis, we propose the detailed form of G as:
where G 1 stands for the targeted misclassi cations of X 1 and G 2 denotes keeping classi cations of X 2 unchanged. G 1 and G 2 are:
e c i 's represent their relative importance to the measurement of modi cations D(δ). t i represents the target label for the i-th image in the S images. G 1 achieves its minimum value, when the labels of the rst S images are changed to their target labels T . Similarly, G 2 obtains its minimum value when the classi cations of the rest R − S images are kept unchanged.
GENERAL ADMM SOLUTION FRAMEWORK
We propose a solution framework based on ADMM to solve (1) for the fault sneaking a ack. e framework is general in that it can deal with both 0 and 2 norms as D(δ). ADMM was rst introduced in the mid-1970s with roots in the 1950s and becomes popular recently for large scale statistics and machine learning problems [32] . ADMM solves the problems in the form of a decompositionalternating procedure, where the global problem is split into local subproblems rst, and then the solutions to small local subproblems are coordinated to nd a solution to the large global problem. It has been proved in [33] that ADMM has at least the linear convergence rate, and it empirically converges in a few tens of iterations.
ADMM Reformulation
As ADMM requires multiple variables for reducing the objective function in alternating directions, we introduce a new auxiliary variable z and (1) can now be reformulated as,
e augmented Lagrangian function of the above problem is:
Applying the scaled form of ADMM by de ning u = ρs, we obtain
ADMM Iterations
ADMM optimizes problem (9) in iterations. Speci cally, in the k-th iteration, the following steps are performed:
As demonstrated above, problem (9) is split into two subproblems, (10) and (11) through ADMM. In (10), the optimal solution z k +1 is obtained by minimizing the augmented Lagrangian function L ρ (δ k , z, s k ) with xed δ k and s k . Similarly, (11) nds the optimal δ k +1 to minimize L ρ (δ, z k +1 , s k ) with xed z k +1 and s k . In (12), we update s k +1 with z k +1 and δ k+1 . We can observe that ADMM updates the two arguments in an alternating fashion, where comes from the term alternating direction.
In the ADMM iterations, problems (10) and (11) are detailed as:
e solutions to the two problems are speci ed as follows.
z step
In this step, we mainly solve (13) . e speci c closed-form solution depends on the D function ( 0 or 2 norm).
Solution for 0 norm.
If the D function takes the 0 norm, (13) has the following form:
e solution can be obtained elementwise [34] as
Solution for 2 norm.
If the D function takes the 2 norm, (13) has the following form:
By 'block so thresholding' operator [34] , the solution is given by
δ step
In this step, we mainly solve (14) . It can be rewri en as
where 
, where H is a pre-de ned positive de nite matrix , and x 2 H = x T Hx. (14) can then be reformulated as:
Le ing H = αI , the solution can be obtained through
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
We demonstrate the experimental results of the proposed fault sneaking a ack on two image classi cation datasets, MNIST [37] and CIFAR-10 [38] . We train two networks for MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, respectively, sharing the same network architecture with four convolutional layers, two max pooling layers, two fully connected layers and one so max layer. ey achieve 99.5% accuracy on MNIST and 79.5% accuracy on CIFAR-10, respectively, which are comparable to the state-of-the-arts. e experiments are conducted on machines with NVIDIA GTX 1080 TI GPUs.
Layer and Type of Parameters to Modify
e DNN model used has three fully connected (FC) layers. We modify the parameters in di erent FC layers. We show the 0 norm (i.e., the number of parameter modi cations) achieved by the fault sneaking a ack when we modify each FC layer in Table 1 . We observe that more parameters are needed to be modi ed with increasing S and R. Besides, changing the last FC layer requires fewer parameter modi cations compared with the rst or second FC layer. e reason is that the last FC layer has more direct in uence on the output, leading to smaller number of modi cations by the fault sneaking a ack. erefore, in the following experiments, we focus on modifying only the last FC layer parameters.
Next we determine the type of parameters to modify that is more e ective to implement the fault sneaking a ack. In the FC layer, the output depends on the weights W and the biases b, that is, FC(x ) = W x + b, where x is the input of the layer. As we can see, the bias parameters are more directly related to the output than the weight parameters. We show the 0 norm and the a ack success rate if we only modify the weight parameters or the bias parameters in the last FC layer in Table 2 . As the bias parameters are more directly related to the output, it usually needs to change fewer bias parameters to achieve the same a ack objective. However, only changing bias parameters has very limited capability which can only lead to the misclassi cation of 1 or 2 images. As observed from Table 2 , changing the classi cation of 4 or more images would be beyond the capability of modifying bias parameters only. is demonstrates the limitation of the single bias a ack (SBA) scheme in [16] , which only modi es the bias to misclassify only one image. Also we nd that SBA can not be extended to solve the case of multiple images with multiple target labels. Considering the limitation of only modifying bias parameters, we choose to perturb both the weight and bias parameters in the following experiments.
0 Norm of Parameter Modi cations
We demonstrate the number of parameter modi cations, i.e., the 0 norm, by the fault sneaking a ack in this section. As observed from Fig. 1 and 2 , for the same R, the 0 norm of parameter modi cations keeps increasing as S increases since more parameters need to be modi ed to change the classi cations of more images into their target labels. We have an interesting nding that when S is in the range of {1, 2, 4}, the 0 norm tends to be smaller as R increases from 200 to 1000 for MNIST. e reason is that larger R means the labels of more images (R − S) need to be kept unchanged, then the modi ed model should be more similar to the original model and therefore fewer modi cations are required. We also notice that this phenomenon disappears when S is larger than 8 for MNIST or for CIFAR-10. Considering the 99.5% and 79.5% accuracy on MNIST and CIFAR-10, we believe the disappearance is related to the DNN model capability. When S is small on MNIST, the DNN model is able to hide a small number of misclassi cations by modifying only a few parameters of the last FC layer. However, when S is relatively large, it is not that easy to hide so many misclassi cations and the fault sneaking a ack has to perturb almost all parameters in the last FC layer without extra ability to spare.
e reason for CIFAR-10 is similar since the capability of the model for CIFAR-10 is limited, with only 79.5% accuracy.
Comparison of 0 and 2 based Attacks
In problem (10), the 0 or 2 norm can be minimized, leading to the corresponding 0 or 2 based fault sneaking a acks. Table 3 compares the 0 and 2 norms of the 0 and 2 based a acks for various con gurations. As seen from Table 3 , the 0 based a ack achieves smaller 0 norm than the 2 based a ack with larger 2 norm, due to the reason that the 2 based a ack tries to minimize the Euclidean distance between the perturbed and original model without considering the number of parameter modi cations.
Test Accuracy a er Parameter Modi cation
As the fault sneaking a ack perturbs the DNN parameters to satisfy speci c a ack requirements, it is important to measure the in uence of the a ack beyond the required objective. In the problem formulation, we try to reduce the in uence of fault sneaking a ack by enforcing the rest R −S images to have unchanged classi cations. In Table 4 , we show the test accuracy on the whole testing datasets for MNIST and CIFAR-10 a er perturbing the model. e test accuracy of the original model is 99.5% for MNIST and 79.5% for CIFAR. As observed from Table 4 , with xed R, the test accuracy on the modi ed model decreases as S increases. is demonstrates that as a nature outcome, changing parameters to misclassify certain images may downgrade the overall accuracy performance of the model. In the case of S = 16 and R = 50, the test accuracy drops from 99.5% to 29.7% for MNIST and from 79.5% to 18.3% for CIFAR. However, we observe that as R increases, the test accuracy keeps increasing for xed S. It demonstrates that keeping the labels of the R − S images unchanged helps to stabilize the model and reduce the in uence of changing the labels of the S images. In the case of S = 16, if R is increased from 50 to 1000, the test accuracy on the 10,000 test images increases from 29.7% to 96.9% for MNIST and from 18.3% to 76.4% for CIFAR. e fault sneaking a ack can achieve classi cation accuracy as high as 98.7% and 78.5% in the case of S = 1 and R = 1000 for MNIST and CIFAR, which only degrades the accuracy by 0.8 percent and 1.0 percent respectively, from the original models. Note that under the same assumption of misclassifying only one image, [16] degrades the accuracy by 3.86 percent and 2.35 percent, respectively, for MNIST and CIFAR in the best case. Compared with [16] , the proposed a ack achieves a great improvement to reduce the in uence of model perturbation.
Tolerance for Sneaking Faults
One objective of fault sneaking a ack is to hide faults by perturbing the DNN parameters. In the experiments, we found that in the case of large S, not all of the S images are changed to their target labels successfully. We de ne the success rate of the S images as the percentage of images successfully changed their labels to the target labels within the S images. We show the success rate of the S images with various S and R con gurations in Fig. 3 . We observe that the success rate keeps almost 100% if S is smaller than 10. When S is larger than 10, the success rate would drop as S increases. Besides, the number of successful injected faults in S is usually around 10 for di erent con guration of S. is demonstrates a limitation of changing the classi cations of certain images by modifying DNN parameters. e DNN model has a tolerance for the sneaking faults -10 successful misclassi cations by modifying the last FC layer.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose fault sneaking a ack to mislead the DNN by modifying model parameters. e 0 and 2 norms are minimized by the general framework with constraints to keep the classi cation of other images unchanged. e experimental evaluations demonstrate that the ADMM based framework can implement the a acks stealthily and e ciently with negligible test accuracy loss.
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